Deficits in category learning in older adults : rule-based versus clustering accounts by Badham, Stephen P. et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Badham, Stephen P., Sanborn, Adam N. and Maylor, Elizabeth A. . (2017) Deficits in category 
learning in older adults : rule-based versus clustering accounts. Psychology and Aging, 32 (5). 
pp. 473-488. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88425/  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 (CC BY 3.0) license 
and may be reused according to the conditions of the license.  For more details see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/   
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version, or, version of record, and may be 
cited as it appears here. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Deficits in Category Learning in Older Adults: Rule-Based Versus
Clustering Accounts
Stephen P. Badham
Nottingham Trent University
Adam N. Sanborn and Elizabeth A. Maylor
University of Warwick
Memory research has long been one of the key areas of investigation for cognitive aging researchers but
only in the last decade or so has categorization been used to understand age differences in cognition.
Categorization tasks focus more heavily on the grouping and organization of items in memory, and often
on the process of learning relationships through trial and error. Categorization studies allow researchers
to more accurately characterize age differences in cognition: whether older adults show declines in the
way in which they represent categories with simple rules or declines in representing categories by
similarity to past examples. In the current study, young and older adults participated in a set of classic
category learning problems, which allowed us to distinguish between three hypotheses: (a) rule-
complexity: categories were represented exclusively with rules and older adults had differential difficulty
when more complex rules were required, (b) rule-specific: categories could be represented either by rules
or by similarity, and there were age deficits in using rules, and (c) clustering: similarity was mainly used
and older adults constructed a less-detailed representation by lumping more items into fewer clusters. The
ordinal levels of performance across different conditions argued against rule-complexity, as older adults
showed greater deficits on less complex categories. The data also provided evidence against rule-specificity,
as single-dimensional rules could not explain age declines. Instead, computational modeling of the data
indicated that older adults utilized fewer conceptual clusters of items in memory than did young adults.
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Categorization is the process of grouping and organizing sen-
sory information and draws upon many constructs in cognitive
science including learning, decision making, reasoning and atten-
tion (Pothos & Wills, 2011). Understanding how individuals form
categories from patterns in the environment is central to human
learning (Feldman, 2000) and is relevant to a variety of circum-
stances in everyday life: Is it high or low fat? Are their policies left
or right wing? Will this medication raise or lower blood pressure?
Surprisingly, given the extensive research into age differences in
memory (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin & Ohta, 2012), there has been far
less research into how young and older adults differ in the learning
of categorical information (cf. Maintenant, Blaye, & Paour, 2011).
Categorization research has the potential to deliver new insight
into age-related changes in memory because these tasks can in-
volve precise manipulations of the structure of categories to reveal
the underlying representation. Therefore, categorization tasks can
better assess the details of learning and the interference between
competing items in memory than can most memory tasks.
A main point of contention in category learning is whether indi-
viduals are using rules or similarity to make their judgments. Rule-
based approaches classically assume that there is a set of features that
describe a category and a new stimulus is either entirely a category
member or not (Bourne, 1970; Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1986;
Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994). In contrast, similarity-based
approaches assume that a new stimulus is compared either directly to
exemplars experienced in the past, or to a single prototype of these
past examples, producing a graded category membership (Medin &
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986; Reed, 1972). The most flexible
similarity-based approach is clustering, which because it clusters past
exemplars into multiple prototypes, can produce representations that
match exemplar models, prototype models, or anywhere in between
(Anderson, 1991; Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; Rosseel, 2002;
Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008).
Initial conceptions of categorization were rule-based, but fol-
lowing theoretical and empirical arguments for graded category
membership, similarity approaches became standard (Rosch, 1973;
Wittgenstein, 1953). Later research leveraged the strengths of both
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rule-based and similarity-based categorization, through the devel-
opment of hybrid models that have both an explicit rule-based
system and an implicit similarity-based system (Ashby, Alfonso-
Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). Although there are empirical
effects in category learning that point to both rule-based and
similarity-based representations, it is possible that deficits in cat-
egory learning in older adults are just of one type. Therefore, our
question is: are age deficits best described as deficits in rule-based
categorization or as deficits in similarity-based categorization?
Investigations into categorization deficits in older adults have
compared young and older adults across various category struc-
tures to determine where the deficits for older adults lie, exploring
both rule-based and clustering accounts. One rule-inspired hypoth-
esis is that older adults are differentially worse at more complex
categories (Cerella, Poon, & Williams, 1980), which we will term
rule-complexity. For example, in Racine, Barch, Braver, and
Noelle (2006) one category was composed of examples lying at the
extremes of the space of possible continuous-feature stimuli, while
the other was composed of examples lying in the middle of the
space of possible stimuli. Participants were told what rule to
follow, where category membership was defined by either a two-
(low complexity) or three- (high complexity) part conjunctive rule.
Racine et al. found that older adults performed differentially worse
on the categories defined by more complex rules. Other categori-
zation studies have supported the rule-complexity hypothesis by
showing that as the task becomes more difficult, age-related def-
icits increase (so long as floor/ceiling effects are avoided). Addi-
tionally, studies involving functional relations (that are similar to
categorization tasks in that participants must learn rules linking
stimuli to responses) demonstrate greater age-related deficits for
more complex relations, such as inverse (Griego & Kliegel, 2007)
and multiplicative (Chasseigne, Lafon, & Mullet, 2002) relations.
A different rule-inspired hypothesis for age deficits follows
from the model COVIS (Ashby et al., 1998). COVIS is a hybrid
model consisting of two systems: an explicit system that can learn
simple rules and an implicit system that can be considered
similarity-based. It has been argued that categorization deficits in
older adults (Rabi & Minda, 2016) and children (Minda, Desro-
ches, & Church, 2008), relative to young adults, are larger for
complex rule-based categorization tasks compared with implicit
categorization tasks. Likewise, when increasing the number of
irrelevant dimensions in a rule-based categorization task, Filoteo,
Maddox, Ing, Zizak, and Song (2005) found a trend for older
participants to perform differentially worse. Older adults may
therefore have difficulty with explicit, rule-based categories that
are arguably more reliant on effortful processing. Age-related
memory deficits are generally reduced or absent for implicit tests
of memory (La Voie & Light, 1994; Light, Prull, La Voie, &
Healy, 2000), where effortful strategic encoding and retrieval
processes are not required. Furthermore, age deficits in executive
prefrontal processing (West, 1996) of rules have been used to
describe older adults’ poor performance at the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test (Rhodes, 2004). Therefore, it seems that a dual-
system account such as COVIS could explain age deficits in
categorization in only its rule-based system but not the implicit
system, a hypothesis we term rule-specificity. However, other
researchers have shown the contrary effect: a larger age deficit in
the implicit system than in the rule-based system (e.g., Filoteo &
Maddox, 2004; Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012).
In contrast to these rule-based accounts is the possibility that age
deficits are implicit, and particularly the notion that older adults
may not generate as detailed an implicit category representation as
do young adults (Love & Gureckis, 2007), a hypothesis we call
clustering. The assumption behind this hypothesis is that people
use multiple prototypes (e.g., clusters) to represent categories, and
the more clusters that are used the more detailed the category
representation can be. Studies have shown that older adults can
construct simple prototype representations as well as can young
adults, but do not represent complex categories with as much detail
as do young adults (Hess, 1982; Hess & Slaughter, 1986). Also,
older adults have poorer memory for category members that are
exceptions to rules (Davis, Love, & Maddox, 2012; Love &
Gureckis, 2007). For example, Davis et al. (2012) showed partic-
ipants images of beetles that were categorized into two groups. The
features of the beetles were arranged such that the majority of
beetles in one group would possess a given feature (e.g., thick legs)
but a small subset would have the opposite feature (e.g., thin
legs—an exception to the rule). Older adults showed a deficit
relative to young adults when categorizing these exception stimuli.
This can be explained as older adults constructing fewer clusters
than young adults to represent categories.
In summary, we have identified three hypotheses related to age
differences in categorization: (a) rule-complexity: differential dif-
ficulty with category structures defined by more complex rules in
a rule-only categorization model, (b) rule-specific: age deficits in
the use of explicit rule-based but not implicit systems of a hybrid
model, and (c) clustering: a tendency for older adults to construct
fewer clusters in similarity-based categories. These explanations are
difficult to tease apart: they can imitate one another quite closely as
more complex categories also generally require both more complex
rules and more clusters to be represented accurately. Researchers have
only begun to test these accounts against one another: Rabi and Minda
(2016) compared the two rule-based accounts and found evidence to
support rule-specificity over rule-complexity. The key evidence was
smaller age deficits in a more complex categorization task compared
with a less complex categorization task. However, this study did not
rule out age deficits attributable to clustering. The current study aimed
to replicate and further explore this key empirical finding to determine
if a rule-specificity account of deficits is plausible, and also to estab-
lish if the empirical age deficits could be explained better with a
clustering account.
The Current Study
Here, we compare the rule-complexity, rule-specificity, and
clustering hypotheses of age deficits against one another using a
seminal paradigm from the categorization literature, the category
learning problems of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). In this
task, participants learn to place a series of eight geometric images
into two categories across a series of learning blocks. The eight
images were formed by factorial combinations of three binary
dimensions (see top panel of Figure 1), which were form (square/
triangle), color (black/white), and size (large/small). Four of the
shapes were assigned to an “” group and four to a “” group.
Shepard et al. (1961) identified six meaningfully distinct ways
to form two groups of four stimuli from the set of eight geometric
images (Types I, II, III, IV, V, and VI). These groupings are based
upon categorization rules of varying complexity and Types I to IV
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were used in the current study (see bottom panel of Figure 1). Type
I is the simplest condition where a single dimension defines
category membership (e.g., all the black images are in the 
category and all the white images are in the  category) and the
other dimensions (e.g., size and form) are irrelevant. Type II
defines category membership by two dimensions (e.g., black tri-
angles and white squares are in the  group) with one irrelevant
dimension (e.g., size). Type III uses all three dimensions to define
category membership and categories are defined by a rule with an
exception (e.g., all the black objects are in the  group apart from
the small black square). Type IV also uses all three dimensions and
all category members share the majority of their features with
other category members (e.g., most of the large, black, and trian-
gular shapes are in the  group). Types III and IV seem similar and
indeed often lead to similar levels of performance (e.g., Shepard et
al., 1961) but one key difference is that participants can respond
with 75% accuracy by paying attention to any single dimension for
Type IV but can only achieve 75% accuracy in Type III with a
single dimension for two out of the three dimensions (e.g., re-
sponding on the basis of color or form alone for Type III in Figure
1 would yield 75% accuracy but size would yield 50% accuracy).
In young adults, performance generally decreases from Type
I to Type IV (Type I  Type II  Type III  Type IV; Kurtz,
Levering, Stanton, Romero, & Morris, 2013; Nosofsky, Gluck,
Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994; Shepard et al., 1961).
For the rule-complexity hypothesis (Cerella et al., 1980), the
prediction is simply that— unless there are floor/ceiling ef-
fects—age differences will follow this same pattern, that is,
increasing age differences from Type I to Type IV. This hy-
pothesis about rule-complexity based on learning difficulty is
bolstered by formal mathematical analyses of the complexity of
the rules needed to learn Types I–IV. Feldman (2000) intro-
duced an explicit Boolean complexity measure of the Shepard
et al. (1961) types, finding that this formal measure of com-
plexity corresponded fairly closely to learning difficulty. Al-
though there is some disagreement about the relative difficulty
of Type III, Boolean complexity and various other measures of
complexity agree that Type IV is more complex than Type II
Figure 1. Top: Stimuli could vary along three dimensions (size, color, and form). Bottom: Examples of
category membership for the eight shapes organized into two groups ( and ) for the four categorization tasks
(Types I to IV) used in the study.
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that itself is more complex than Type I (Goodman, Tenenbaum,
Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008; Vigo, 2006, 2009). Therefore, both
mathematical and behavioral accounts of complexity would
predict greater age differences for Type IV than for Type II and
greater age differences for Type II than for Type I.
Rabi and Minda (2016) found age differences that clearly went
against the predictions of rule-complexity. Whereas young adults
showed better performance on Type II than Type IV, older adults
showed the opposite: their Type IV performance exceeded their
Type II performance. The deficit in Type II was taken as evidence
of rule-specificity in age deficits. It was argued that older adults
were generally not able to use multidimensional rules, because of
their poor overall performance on Type II. Also it was argued that
older adults were unable to transition to the more flexible implicit
system, and so “applied single-dimensional rules during Type II
learning, but frequently switched rules during the course of the
task to avoid negative feedback” (p. 194). Thus, we formulate the
rule-specificity hypothesis to mean that older adults cannot use
multidimensional rules, and must use either single-dimensional
rules or their intact implicit system instead. This rule-specificity
account was bolstered by an association between backward digit
span and Type II performance, plausibly tying complex rule-based
categorization to working memory capacity. Rule-specificity was
also suggested to explain the reliable deficit older adults showed in
Type IV performance: this was potentially a result of older adults
following simple rules in Type IV rather than switching over to the
more flexible implicit similarity-based system, as young adults do
(e.g., Maddox et al., 2010).
Explanations based on deficits in rule use, however, are not the
only kind of explanation for these age deficits. A different hypoth-
esis was investigated by Davis et al. (2012) who found that older
participants struggled much more with learning the exceptions to
rules (summarized earlier). They proposed a clustering account of
their results, that is, items were grouped into clusters, each of
which is represented as a prototype of the items in a cluster.
Clustering explanations essentially represent a category by multi-
ple prototypes, which interpolates between the extremes of single
prototype models and exemplar models (that represent all of the
previously experienced items individually). Davis et al. supposed
that older adults have more difficulty in constructing new clusters of
items in memory, meaning that categories are represented more
coarsely by older adults (see also Love & Gureckis, 2007). Their
argument was bolstered by fitting their data with a clustering model of
categorization, the Rational Model of Categorization (RMC; Ander-
son, 1991), and showing that the parameters indicated that older adults
did not construct as many clusters as did young adults.
Intuitively, a clustering account could also explain the pattern of
age deficits found by Rabi and Minda (2016). Types I and IV can
both be represented well by a single cluster or prototype per
category because the two categories in these tasks are linearly
separable: a straight plane can be placed in the space of stimuli in
Figure 1 for these two tasks that perfectly separates the two
categories. In contrast, representing each category in Type II with
a single cluster would be a catastrophe: because of the symmetric
arrangement of the stimuli in each category, the prototype of each
cluster would be exactly in the middle of the cube of stimuli, and
so the inferred categories are indistinguishable and performance
would be at chance. Thus, the number of clusters is more critical
in Type II than in Type I or Type IV, and so if older adults have
greater difficulty constructing more clusters, then larger age dif-
ferences are expected in Type II compared with Types I or IV,
matching the empirical results.
Although it is intuitive that a clustering account can explain age
deficits, we cannot know whether rule-specificity or clustering
deficits better match human behavior until we evaluate them
against data. We collected our own data in the Shepard et al.
(1961) tasks, including Type III in addition to Types I, II, and IV,
which first allowed us to determine if the pattern of age deficits
replicated. Type III provides another benchmark against which to
evaluate Types I, II, and IV, and an opportunity to see if Types III
and IV are also equally difficult for older adults, as seen in young
adults and as many complexity approaches predict. Using these
new data, we then evaluated the plausibility of the idea that older
adults were using single-dimensional rules, using a variety of
measures. We finally fit the RMC to the trial-by-trial data to see if
a clustering account could quantitatively match the data.
Method
Design
Young and older adults learned to categorize eight shapes into
two groups. Each participant completed four conditions (Types I to
IV) where group membership was determined by separate rules as
outlined in the introduction.
Participants
Forty-eight young adults (42 female) aged 18–21 years (M 
19.3, SD  0.7) and 48 healthy older adults (32 female) aged
60–87 years (M  74.7, SD  5.6) took part in the experiment.
Ten of the older adults were in their 60s, 30 in their 70s, and eight
in their 80s, with all except four aged 66–83. Young participants
were recruited from the University of Warwick and received
course credit. Older participants were active members of our Age
Study Panel who were visited in their own homes and received £5
($7); their self-rated eyesight, hearing, and general health averaged
4.1, 4.0, and 4.0 (equivalent to “good”), respectively, on a 5-point
scale (1 very poor to 5 very good). Participants were recruited in
two batches (though all were tested within a 7-week period, January
through March, 2015), and the statistical implications of this are
discussed in the results. All participants provided written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the University of Warwick’s
Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee.
Young and older participants did not show evidence of a dif-
ference in their years of education, t(53.87)  1.88, BF10  1.011
(Myoung 14.01, SDyoung 0.93; Molder 14.97, SDolder 3.41).
To assess cognitive functioning, participants completed the Digit
Symbol Substitution test from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale—Revised (Wechsler, 1981) as a measure of processing
speed, and the multiple choice part of the Mill Hill vocabulary test
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1988) as a measure of crystallized
intelligence. The results were consistent with the literature (e.g.,
Salthouse, 2010): young adults performed better than older adults
at the speed task, t(94)  10.98, BF10  2.42  1015 (Myoung 
1 See later for explanation of the use of Bayes factors for comparisons.
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74.63, SDyoung  10.04; Molder  51.96, SDolder  10.19), and
older adults performed better than young adults at the vocabulary
task, t(94)  8.99, BF10  1.95  1011 (Myoung  16.83,
SDyoung  3.47; Molder  23.67, SDolder  3.96).
Materials
Images of eight geometric shapes were constructed for use in the
experiment. Large images had a base of width 250 pixels and small
images had a base of width 125 pixels, corresponding to widths of
approximately eight and four degrees of viewing angle on screen,
respectively. Triangles were equilateral and both square and trian-
gle image bases were horizontal. Images were presented in black
or white on a midgray background.
Counterbalancing. The four conditions were within partici-
pants so this resulted in 24 possible test orders for Types I to IV.
Additionally, each condition had several permutations (e.g., Type
I had three permutations because category membership could be
defined by color, form, or size). Types II, III, and IV had 3, 12, and
4 permutations, respectively. Twenty-four versions of the experi-
ment were created (one for each test order) and the permutations of
each type were randomly assigned to each version such that each
permutation was used equally across the experiment (for simplifica-
tion, Type III was reduced to 3 permutations by assigning all but one
dimension randomly). Category memberships  and  were also
randomly determined. These 24 versions of the experiment were then
used four times (twice with young and twice with older adults).
Procedure
Participants were initially shown rule-based instructions taken
verbatim from Kurtz et al. (2013) who found that such instructions
are more likely to yield the typical Type II advantage (relative to
Types III and IV) shown in the literature. These instructions
encourage participants to “learn a rule that allows [them] to tell
whether each example belongs in the alpha or beta category”
(Kurtz et al., 2013, p. 6). Participants were then shown a single
screen containing all eight shapes (in no particular arrangement,
and without any category information) so that they could clearly
see the differences between the shapes. They were informed that
these were all of the shapes that would be used in the experiment.
Following this, they commenced the first condition of the exper-
iment.
In each trial, an image was presented centrally on the screen.
Participants were initially required to guess if it belonged in the 
or  category by pressing the keys “F” and “J” on the computer
keyboard, which were relabeled “Alpha” and “Beta,” respectively
(the words Alpha and Beta were also displayed in the bottom left
and right corners of the screen, respectively). The image remained
on screen until a response was made, then after 500 ms of blank
screen, feedback was provided. The image reappeared on screen
and either “Correct!” appeared above it in green or “Incorrect!” in
red. For both feedback options, below the feedback image ap-
peared the correct response in blue, for example, “Answer 
Alpha.” The feedback remained on screen until the participant
pressed the spacebar, then a further 500 ms of blank screen was
displayed before the next trial.
In the first two blocks, all eight shapes were presented in the
first half of the block and then again in the second half. This
limited the possibility of the same shape appearing in adjacent
trials. In subsequent blocks, the eight shapes were presented twice
in each block of 16 trials without any constraints. This ordering
replicates the original Shepard et al. (1961) study. Participants
completed the task for six blocks (96 trials) or until they reached
a criterion of perfect performance in two consecutive blocks. Once
a condition was complete, a message on screen indicated that “a
new rule [would] determine which images belong to each cate-
gory.” Participants could rest between conditions as they wished.
The experiment continued until the participant had completed all
four categorization conditions.
Results
During our data collection process, we found interesting trends
(qualitatively identical to those we report below) after testing 48
participants (i.e., 24 young and 24 older), but the key comparison
(namely, the age by condition interaction) did not reach the stan-
dard value for statistical significance. Therefore, we tested an
additional 48 participants and stopped our experiment at that point.
This stopping rule invalidates the p values calculated using stan-
dard null hypothesis significance (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007), so
we report test statistics and effect sizes without the p values.
Instead we report Bayes factors, which provide a valid measure of
the evidence provided by the data even when the rule for stopping
data collection depends on the results of a test (Rouder, 2014).
This measure even provides strong guarantees about how much an
experimenter can influence the statistical results, in particular
when finding evidence that favors the alternative hypothesis (San-
born & Hills, 2014).
Standard null hypothesis significance tests assess the probability
of a test statistic arising from the null hypothesis, limiting re-
searchers to only evaluating the plausibility of the null, and leaving
them in an awkward position if there is not enough evidence to
reject the null. In contrast, Bayesian methods explicitly compare
the probability of the null and alternative hypotheses on even
ground, so that evidence can be found in favor of the alternative
hypothesis, the null hypothesis, or neither (Gallistel, 2009; Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). A common Bayesian
measure of evidence is the Bayes factor (BF10; Kass & Raftery,
1995) that provides an odds ratio for the alternative/null hypoth-
eses (values 1 favor the null hypothesis and values 1 favor the
alternative hypothesis). For example, a BF10 of 2.5 would indicate
that the alternative hypothesis is 2.5 times more likely than the null
and a BF10 of 0.40 would indicate the converse (see Jarosz &
Wiley, 2014). Associating labels with these values is arbitrary, but
in past work labels such as “substantial,” “strong,” and “decisive”
have been associated with Bayes factors of 3, 10, and 100, respec-
tively (Wetzels et al., 2011). These Bayes factors were calculated
using the JASP computer software (Love et al., 2015). All t tests
are two-tailed using the standard Cauchy prior width of 0.707. The
Bayesian analyses of variance (ANOVAs) construct a model for
each of the possible combinations of terms and we report
BFinclusion for each term because it gives a summary of the evi-
dence for including that term in the models.
For the accuracy data, where a condition was terminated early
because of a participant reaching criterion, 100% accuracy was
assumed for all subsequent uncompleted blocks (as is typical with
this paradigm: e.g., Kurtz et al., 2013; Nosofsky, Gluck, et al.,
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1994). Figure 2 shows the overall means for Blocks 1–6, while
Figure 3 shows overall age differences, for Types I–IV. Perfor-
mance accuracy was entered into a 2 (Age: young, older)  4
(Condition: Types I to IV)  6 (Block: 1–6) repeated measures
ANOVA. Young adults were more accurate than older adults, F(1,
94)  48.86, MSE  0.17, p2  .34, BF10  3.16  1012. There
was a main effect of condition,2 F(2.59, 243.10) 129.83, MSE
0.07, p2  .58, BF10  1012, with Type I learned better than all
other conditions (performance on Types II to IV is investigated
further below). A main effect of block showed that performance
improved over time, F(3.31, 311.55) 138.91, MSE 0.02, p2 
.60, BF10  1012. Age interacted with condition, F(2.59, 243.1) 
3.26, MSE  0.07, p2  .03, BF10  7651, but there was no
evidence that it interacted with block, F(3.31, 311.55)  4.02,
MSE  0.02, p2  .04, BF10  0.88. There was sizable evidence
against the three-way interaction between age, condition, and
block, F(10.64, 999.82)  3.31, MSE  0.02, p2  .03, BF10 
4  10	3. As can be seen in Figure 2, the young adults’ Type I
performance was near ceiling, which could potentially be driving
the age by condition interaction (see Figure 3).
To investigate potential age interactions without ceiling perfor-
mance, the above ANOVA was repeated but with Type I excluded
from the condition factor. Young adults performed better than
older adults, F(1, 94)  53.78, MSE  0.14, p2  .36, BF10 
1.33  1012, there was evidence for a main effect of condition,
F 1, BF10 3.62, and accuracy improved across blocks, F(3.46,
324.82)  87.48, MSE  0.03, p2  .48, BF10  1012. There was
an age by block interaction, F(3.46, 324.82)  7.61, MSE  0.03,
p2  .08, BF10  1.02  104, because of slower learning in older
adults. More important, the age by condition interaction remained,
F(1.70, 159.94)  3.61, MSE  0.06, p2  .04, BF10  20.50,
confirming the different age-related deficits between Types II–IV
evident in Figure 3; this interaction is investigated further below.
There was evidence against the other interactions in the analysis
(Condition  Block, F  1.36, BF10  2  10	3, Age 
Condition  Block, F  1, BF10  2.65  10	5).
To interpret the above age by condition interaction, the condi-
tion by block (3  6) ANOVA was run separately for young and
older adults. Older adults had a main effect of condition, F(1.78,
83.51)  4.83, MSE  0.04, p2  .09, BF10  186.6, but there
was evidence that young adults did not, F  1, BF10  7.5 
10	2. T tests (collapsed across blocks) revealed that older adults
performed best at Type IV, M  0.62, SD  0.08, which was
better than Type II, M  0.57, SD  0.11, t(47)  3.10, BF10 
10.04, and possibly better than Type III, M  0.59, SD  0.08,
t(47)  2.36, BF10  1.92 (whereas Type II and III performance
appeared the same, t  1, BF10  0.24). Numerically, young
adults performed best at Type II, M  0.74, SD  0.16, but there
was evidence that performance did not differ from that in Type III,
M 0.72, SD 0.12, t(47) 1, BF10 0.229, and Type IV, M
0.72, SD 0.11 t(47) 1, BF10 0.232. There was also evidence
that performance did not differ between Type III and Type IV,
t(47)  1, BF10  0.157.
Testing for Rule Use
The rule-specificity hypothesis is that older adults show deficits
in the rule-based system, but have an intact implicit system.
Because older adults perform worse across all four types, the rule
specificity hypothesis implies that all of these declines are because
of worse rule-based categorization. In particular, Rabi and Minda
(2016) hypothesized that older adults are only rarely able to use
conjunctive or disjunctive rules and instead must rely on single-
dimensional rules. This can explain the superior performance that
older adults demonstrated on Type IV versus Type II: any single-
dimensional rule would result in 75% accuracy for Type IV, but
result in 50% accuracy for Type II.
We first investigated whether conjunctive and disjunctive, or
single-dimensional rules were used by looking at the consistency
with which individuals were adhering to these rules in each of the
four problems. To do so, we created a measure that is diagnostic as
to whether single-dimensional rules are being used. First, we
computed the number of mismatches (i.e., Hamming distance)
between the responses in each block and the responses that would
have been made using each of the three possible single-
dimensional rules. Then the minimum of the three Hamming
distances in each block was taken as the measure of adherence to
the closest single-dimensional rule. The result is a score for each
individual in each block, and the mean scores for the two age
groups over the blocks are shown in Figure 4. Here, perfect
performance would result in (minimum) Hamming distances of
zero for Type I, eight for Type II, and four for both Types III and
IV. If participants are consistently using a single-dimensional rule
for any problem, then the Hamming distance will be zero.
For each type, a 2 (Age: young, older)  6 (Block: 1–6)
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. For Type I, older
adults had larger Hamming distances than young adults, F(1,
94)  7.57, MSE  9.36, p2  .08, BF10  4.55, and the
Hamming distances decreased across blocks showing a trajectory
toward the correct distance of zero, F(3.10, 291.20)  81.31,
MSE  1.52, p2  .46, BF10  1012, with no interaction, F(3.10,
291.20)  1.75, MSE  9.36, p2  .02, BF10  0.534.
For Type II, older adults had smaller Hamming distances than
young adults, F(1, 94)  21.02, MSE  5.63, p2  .18, BF10 
1.42  107, the Hamming distances increased across blocks,
F(4.31, 405.15) 15.30, MSE 1.60, p2 .14, BF10 1012, and
to a greater extent in young compared with older adults, F(4.31,
405.15) 10.11, MSE 1.60, p2 .10, BF10 2.79 109. Note
that post hoc tests revealed that young adults showed a trajectory
toward the correct distance of eight across blocks, F(3.37,
158.49)  25.16, MSE  1.97, p2  .35, BF10  1012, but there
was evidence that older adults remained constant across blocks,
F(5, 235)  1.17, MSE  1.43, p2  .02, BF10  0.05. Thus, it
appears that older adults were neither trending toward using
single-dimensional rules consistently, nor trending toward using
the correct multidimensional rules consistently. Their responses in
Type II problems were stuck between these two extremes, and did
not change across blocks.
For Type III, there was no effect of age, F  1, BF10  0.153,
the Hamming distances did not change across blocks, F  1,
BF10  0.003, and there was no interaction, F(5, 470)  1.95,
MSE  1.47, p2  .02, BF10  6.93  10	4.
For Type IV, there was no effect of age, F  1.00, BF10 
0.161, the Hamming distances decreased across blocks, F(5,
2 Throughout this article, any violations of sphericity in ANOVAs were
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
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470)  3.52, MSE  1.44, p2  .04, BF10  1.693, and there was
no interaction, F  1, BF10  0.018.
For Types III and IV, all participants were close to the
Hamming distance that perfect performance would produce
across all blocks. However, this only shows that their responses
showed the right amount of deviation from single-dimensional
rules— clearly the actual responding of both young and older
adults was far from perfect for these two types (see Figure 2).
From the Hamming distance measures, older adults appear to
be unable to learn the multidimensional rules required for Type
II problems, and also do not appear to be using single-
dimensional rules consistently instead. Of course, older adults
may not be using single-dimensional rules consistently through-
out a block as the Hamming distance measures, but instead are
quickly switching between single-dimensional rules as they
accumulate negative feedback (Ashby et al., 1998; Rabi &
Minda, 2016). Fortunately, the Shepard et al. (1961) stimuli
allow us to assess how often quick switches in single-
dimensional rules are occurring by looking for consecutive
trials in which the stimuli are maximally distant from one
another (i.e., in Figure 1 pairs of stimuli that are in the opposite
corners of the cube from one another). Looking at these con-
secutive trials (that make up 13% of all trials), participants who
use the same single-dimensional rule in the two trials will
always make two different responses, no matter which single-
dimensional rule is used.
Figure 5 shows the proportion of trials on which young and
older participants made the different responses to maximally
different stimuli on consecutive trials, meaning that the two
responses were consistent with using the same single-
dimensional rule. The other types are included for complete-
ness, but Type II is the most interesting task in this analysis
because of the possibility that older adults are quickly switching
between single-dimensional rules as they are unable to use
multiple dimensional rules. In Type II only there is also a clear
contrast between correct responding and consistent single-
dimensional rule use: correct responding predicts a value near 0
while single-dimensional rule use predicts a value near 1. As
shown in Figure 5, young adults make the same response more
than half the time, while older adults make the same response
almost exactly half the time (and only two older adults never
made this response). Such a low percentage of different re-
sponses cannot result from consistent use of single-dimensional
rules even across two consecutive trials; instead it looks most
like randomly selecting a single-dimensional rule on each trial.
What is particularly striking is that the proportion of different
responses (indicating single-dimensional rule use) is only half,
even when older adults made the correct response to the pre-
vious trial. This is notable because the COVIS explicit system,
which is used as the basis for the rule-specificity account,
assumes that a rule will always be used again on the next trial
if it is successful (Ashby et al., 1998).
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Figure 2. Accuracy for young and older adults learning categorization Types I, II, III, and IV across six
learning blocks (16 trials per block). Error bars are 
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Interim Summary
In brief, young adults performed better than older adults at the
categorization tasks and the two age groups had qualitatively
different patterns of performance: For young adults, our data
replicated the traditional pattern of accuracy (Type I  Type II 
Type III  Type IV; e.g., Shepard et al., 1961). However, older
adults showed superior performance in Type IV compared with
Type II. These age differences were similar to those found by Rabi
and Minda (2016) who hypothesized that older adults’ perfor-
mance was driven by increased reliance on single-dimensional
rules during learning. In the current study, statistical tests of
single-dimensional rule use did not support this hypothesis.
Model-Based Analysis
We presented the intuition above that constructing fewer clus-
ters in the RMC (Anderson, 1991) would result in the observed age
deficits. To verify that young and older adults did construct dif-
ferent numbers of clusters and that it could produce the same
pattern of age deficits, we fit the RMC to the data. The RMC is a
model that infers which items belong together in clusters, based on
both their physical features and their category labels. In this model,
the category label is treated as just another feature, so it is possible
that items from two separate categories will be placed in the same
cluster. When making category judgments, the RMC first finds the
probability that the new item comes from each of the clusters
(including the possibility that the item belongs in a new cluster)
and then weights the prediction of each cluster/level of the cate-
gory label by these probabilities.
The RMC used three parameters in its original formulation: a
coupling parameter, c, a physical salience parameter, sP, and a
label salience parameter, sL. The coupling parameter controls the
prior probability of the number of clusters. A high coupling pa-
rameter means there will be fewer clusters, whereas a low coupling
parameter means there will be more clusters. The two salience
parameters control how “pure” each of the clusters are along the
physical (e.g., size, form, and color) or label features, with lower
values meaning that each cluster is more likely to contain only a
single value of each feature (e.g., this cluster will only have
triangles or only squares). For the label salience parameter, a low
value means that it is less likely that two items from different
categories will be placed in the same cluster. The RMC is also
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Figure 4. Hamming distance for young and older adults across learning Blocks 1–6. The dashed line indicates
the Hamming distance that would occur if participants were responding with 100% accuracy for each type,
though this is necessary and not sufficient to produce perfect performance: matching this distance does not imply
100% accuracy. The hollow line indicates the distance corresponding to single-dimensional rule use (SD). Error
bars are 
1 SE.
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often augmented by a determinism parameter, r, which acts to
bring response probabilities either closer to chance for low r or
closer to deterministic performance for high r (Nosofsky, Gluck, et
al., 1994). Full details of the RMC are given in Appendix A.
To investigate which parameters were responsible for the dif-
ferences between the age groups, we created a set of 16 models.
Every model was fit using the same parameters for all participants
within an age group, but the different models allowed for different
sets of parameters to differ between groups. A description of each
model along with several measures of how well each fit the data is
shown in Table 1. For all of these measures, a lower value
indicates a better model. The negative log likelihood was com-
puted across all participants and only measures the fit to the data,
while Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) adjust the overall negative log likelihood
with penalties for model complexity. We also converted AIC and
BIC values into the more interpretable AIC and BIC weights,
which approximate the probability of each model given the data,
assuming the models are equally likely before the experiment
began (Akaike, 1978; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers &
Farrell, 2004).
Using both AIC and BIC weights, the best model was clearly
Model 14, which allowed for three of the four parameters to differ
between young and older adults: sP, c, and r. The performances of
young and older adults predicted by this model are shown in
Figure 6, and they generally match the human data well. The main
discrepancy is that within each age group the model did not learn
Type I tasks as quickly as participants did, but the overall accuracy
predicted by the best-fitting parameters matched the ordering of
accuracy on the problem types for each age group.
The best-fitting values of Model 14’s parameters are shown in
Table 2. Older adults had a higher best-fitting coupling parameter
than did young adults, implying that they formed fewer clusters.
However, unlike Davis et al. (2012), we allowed the physical and
label salience parameters to vary, as these parameters can also
affect the clustering of the stimuli. A more direct view of how
young and older adults clustered the stimuli can be obtained by
looking at assignments of items to clusters made by the model. We
found that the different orders in which the trials were presented
led to variability in the clusters formed across individuals with the
same parameters. In Figure 7, we show the assignments made by
the model for the last block of stimuli in the experiment. Whereas
young and older adults both used two clusters for Type I, the
model indicates that older adults were more likely to use fewer
clusters to represent each of Types II–IV. Overall, older adults
were not using as many clusters as were young adults.
The differences in parameters between young and older adults
do not just impact how the items are clustered. These parameters
also impact how a category judgment is made given a particular
representation. Older adults had higher values of c, as well as
lower values of sP and r. For new items, the value of c controls the
influence of the existing clusters relative to a new cluster that
contains just the new item and has no label information. As a
result, the higher value of c means that older adults have stronger
category preferences than young adults given their representation.
Relatedly, lower values of sP for older adults mean that items will
have a stronger match to clusters they belonged to in previous
blocks, increasing the strength of category preferences. However,
the lower value of r for older adults means that responses will be
more stochastic and that the most likely category label will not be
chosen as often.
To determine the overall impact of these parameter differences
on how category labels are chosen for incoming items, we looked
at what would happen if older adults clustered like older adults, but
made choices like young adults. This was done to establish
whether the predicted reversal in Type II and Type IV performance
was because of the clustering of items or to the choice parameters.
In essence we used different parameters at different stages of each
trial: the young adults’ parameters were used when making a
category label prediction, but after receiving feedback the older
adults’ parameters were used to assign an item to a cluster. The
impact of using the older adults’ choice parameters on accuracy
can be seen in Table 3. If older adults behaved like young adults
while predicting category labels, then they perform equivalently or
slightly better than young adults for Type I (because young and
older adults used the same clusters), and perform better but not as
well as young adults for Types II–IV. More important, the perfor-
mance on Type IV problems is still predicted to be more accurate
than on Type II problems, which means that the clustering, rather
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than the choice parameters, is controlling relative performance for
these two problem types for older adults.
Beyond the accuracy on Types I–IV, we also investigated what
the best-fitting version of the RMC predicted for the statistics we
developed to test for the presence of single-dimensional rules.
Predicted Hamming distances were calculated by finding the ex-
pected minimum distance to the set of single-dimensional rules for
each block based on the model predictions for each stimulus. The
predicted distances matched the empirical distances well, with the
exception that participants corresponded to single-dimensional
rules in the Type I task better than the model predicted. The
Pearson correlation between model predictions and empirical dis-
tances across all participants, types, and blocks was .95.
Figure 5 shows the RMC predictions for consecutive maximally
different stimuli. For the lower panel (“previous response cor-
rect”), the trials selected were just the same trials selected in the
analysis of the data. These model predictions show the same
overall patterns as the human data, in particular the near 0.5 rate of
different responding for older adults in the Type II task. The
Pearson correlation between the model and data across age groups
and tasks for all responses was .96, and for previous response
correct the correlation was .97.
Discussion
We investigated three hypotheses of the source of age differ-
ences in categorization in our experiment: rule-complexity, rule-
specificity, and clustering. In line with Rabi and Minda (2016), our
results supported an age-related reversal of performance: Type II
task performance was reliably worse for older adults than Type IV
task performance, but Type II performance was statistically the
same (and numerically better) than Type IV for young adults.3
Because the rule-complexity hypothesis predicts that Type IV
performance would be impacted more than Type II performance
for older adults, this effect serves as strong evidence against a
rule-complexity explanation of age deficits. More generally, it is
evidence against any explanation that holds that age deficits will
always be larger when the task is more difficult. More subtly, we
found that while Type III and IV performance was equivalent for
young adults, older adults were perhaps slightly better at Type IV
than III, providing some additional evidence against a rule-
complexity account.
Rabi and Minda (2016) attributed the Type II deficit in older
adults to rule-specificity. They argued that older adults were gen-
erally unable to learn complex verbal rules. They found very little
evidence for perfect correspondence to single-dimensional rules in
their data, and supposed that older adults were switching between
single-dimensional rules as they received negative feedback on
their performance. In our data, we also found evidence against
older adults generally being able to learn complex verbal rules in
our Hamming distance analysis. Furthermore, we looked closely at
the data to see if single-dimensional rule use was plausible.4 Our
Hamming distance analysis provided additional evidence that
single-dimensional rules were not being used consistently by older
adults in the Type II task, as they did not appear to be moving
closer to single-dimensional rules in that task. Also, our consecu-
tive trial analysis showed that quickly switching between single-
dimensional rules did not describe older adults well either. Older
adults made responses consistent with using the same single-
dimensional rule only on about half of trials in which this behavior
3 Type II has been found to be better than Type IV for young adults, but
not in every experiment. The effect is more likely to be found under the
instructions that we used (Kurtz et al., 2012).
4 We did not fit a model of single-dimensional rule use because there are
a variety of ways to implement this approach, so we made a more general
qualitative argument.
Table 1
Model Comparison Between Versions of the Rational Model of Categorization That Tests for Differences in Parameters Between
Age Groups
Model
Parameters differing between
age groups
Number of
parameters
Negative log
likelihood AIC
AIC
weights BIC
BIC
weights
1 None 4 20,740 41,488 .0000 41,522 .0000
2 sP 5 20,268 40,547 .0000 40,589 .0000
3 sL 5 20,517 41,044 .0000 41,086 .0000
4 c 5 20,383 40,776 .0000 40,819 .0000
5 r 5 20,339 40,688 .0000 40,731 .0000
6 sP, sL 6 20,243 40,498 .0000 40,549 .0000
7 sP, c 6 20,305 40,622 .0000 40,673 .0000
8 sP, r 6 20,221 40,453 .0000 40,504 .0000
9 sL, c 6 20,324 40,661 .0000 40,712 .0000
10 sL, r 6 20,328 40,668 .0000 40,719 .0000
11 c, r 6 20,238 40,489 .0000 40,540 .0000
12 sP, sL, c 7 20,241 40,495 .0000 40,555 .0000
13 sP, sL, r 7 20,205 40,424 .0000 40,484 .0000
14 sP, c, r 7 20,178 40,371 .7136 40,430 .9943
15 sL, c, r 7 20,200 40,414 .0000 40,474 .0000
16 sP, sL, c, r 8 20,178 40,373 .2864 40,441 .0057
Note. sP is the physical salience parameter, sL is the label salience parameter, c is the coupling parameter, and r is the determinism parameter. Negative
log likelihood is the goodness of fit of the model (smaller is better), and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
are two different measures that balance goodness of fit with a penalty for model complexity (smaller is better). AIC weights and BIC weights transform
the AIC and BIC values to approximate the probability of the model given the data (larger is better). The best model by both AIC and BIC is in bold.
o
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could be assessed, even when just looking at pairs of trials in
which the first response was correct.
For a rule-based system, using a rule more often after receiving
positive feedback on its performance is critical—otherwise no
learning is occurring. Stronger assumptions have been made: the
COVIS explicit rule-based system assumes that positive feedback
always leads to using the same rule again on the next trial (Ashby
et al., 1998). As a result, being inconsistent with a single-
dimensional rule on half of trials after positive feedback is difficult
to explain with a single-dimensional rule system, unless it is
working extremely poorly: the system is randomly choosing
among all possible rules on each trial with equal probability.
However, we show in Appendix B that many participants re-
sponded reliably above chance. Together these results make for an
argument against older adults using single-dimensional rules in the
Type II task, where they showed the greatest deficits.
A remaining possibility for the rule-specificity hypothesis is that
older adults were attempting to use multidimensional rules, but
were just worse at finding the correct multidimensional rules
compared to young adults. Our Hamming distance analysis argued
against this interpretation because there was no trend toward older
adults moving further away from single-dimensional rules over
blocks, but there exist many different proposals of how complex
rules are learned (e.g., COVIS, Rational Rules, or Nosofsky,
Palmeri, et al.’s, 1994, RULEX) and these would have to be
examined in detail.
The clustering hypothesis better accounts for these age deficits.
We formalized the clustering hypothesis in the RMC and quanti-
tatively showed that the deficits can be explained as older adults
being less able to form new clusters than young adults. The
best-fitting RMC showed the expected reversal in Type II and
Type IV performance between older and young adults. The RMC
also matched the empirical data well on the Hamming distances
and consecutive trial analysis that argued against single-
dimensional rules.
Using the clustering hypothesis rather than rules to explain age
deficits leads to reinterpretations of some past results. For exam-
ple, Maddox, Pacheco, Reeves, Zhu, and Schnyer (2010) found
equal age-related declines in rule-based and information-
integration tasks (akin to Type II and Type IV, respectively) when
both were generated from four clusters. If older adults struggle to
produce as many clusters as young adults, these equal declines
would be expected. Additionally, clustering can be used to explain
some of the strongest evidence for rule-specificity age deficits:
age-related increases in perseverative errors in the WCST (Rhodes,
2004). Clustering models can be used in associative learning tasks
to explain how old associations do and do not interfere with new
associations: if both old and new associations are part of the same
cluster then there will be interference because they cannot be
accessed separately, but if old and new associations are part of
separate clusters then the new associations can potentially be
accessed without interference (e.g., Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010).
If older adults have more trouble creating new clusters, this then
could explain why they show greater perseverative errors when the
rule changes in the WCST.
Interpreting age declines as an increased difficulty in construct-
ing new clusters yields a new interpretation of the relationship
between working memory capacity and type of task. Rabi and
Minda (2016) found that working memory capacity was related to
performance on Type II but not on Type I tasks. Instead of
Table 2
Best-Fitting Rational Model of Categorization Parameters for
Young and Older Age Groups
Age sP sL c r
Young 0.6888 0.1615 0.5044 0.7738
Older 0.4427 0.1615 0.7450 0.4540
Note. sP is the physical salience parameter, sL is the label salience
parameter, c is the coupling parameter, and r is the determinism parameter.
In the best-fitting model, sL is the same for young and older age groups.
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Figure 6. Model predictions for young and older adults learning categorization Types I, II, III, and IV across
six learning blocks.
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interpreting working memory capacity as related to performance
on complex rules, we can interpret it as necessary for constructing
more clusters, because each additional cluster means that there is
more information to represent. Rabi and Minda argued that Type
II may be more influenced by working memory than Type IV and
recently, Stukken, Van Rensbergen, Vanpaemel, and Storms
(2016) showed that higher working memory ability was related to
utilization of a greater number of clusters during categorization.
However, contrary to this view, Lewandowsky (2011) found that
working memory capacity affected performance on Types I–VI
similarly. More research is needed to clarify the relationship be-
tween working memory and clustering, especially as clustering is
more naturally described as implicit memory, and older adults
show greater deficits in explicit than implicit memory.
Figure 7. Visualization of how young and older adults clustered the items for Types I–IV. The plots underneath
each type display the different ways the problem was clustered across participants. Within each plot, the three
dimensions represent the three different physical dimensions, though the dimension identities have been ignored
and cluster assignments renumbered to minimize the variety of different patterns. Gray and white circles indicate
the feedback given to the items and the numbers within each circle label the cluster to which that item has been
assigned. Text underneath each plot gives the number of young and older adults who used that set of clusters
for that problem.
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Clustering represents one implicit type of categorization, but
there are others. Exemplar models, formalized as the General-
ized Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) and ALCOVE
(Kruschke, 1992), also could potentially explain these results.
These exemplar models use the mechanism of selective atten-
tion to produce better performance in Type II than Type IV
problems. As it is easier to selectively attend to fewer dimen-
sions, Type II has an advantage over Type IV because in Type
II one of the dimensions can be completely ignored (see Figure
1). The claim for selective attention has been bolstered by
findings that the performance advantage for Type II over Type
IV only occurs for separable dimensions, like those used in our
experiment, where selective attention can operate. The reverse
pattern occurs with integral dimensions, such as the hue and
saturation of colors, for which selective attention is much
harder to use (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1996).
A deficit in selective attention is another nonrule-based ap-
proach for explaining the reversal of Type II and IV perfor-
mance between young and older adults. However, it is not clear
whether selective attention can explain our results. Maddox,
Filoteo, and Huntington (1998) tested selective attention for
integral and separable stimuli, investigating how well young
and older adults could ignore irrelevant information on nonse-
lected dimensions. They found that for separable dimensions,
older adults were just as good as young adults at selective
attention, though they only tested application of a known cat-
egorization rule rather than learning an unknown rule as we did
in our experiment. Future work could combine our task with a
selective attention task to see if individual differences in selec-
tive attention in older adults correspond with individual differ-
ences in Type II and Type IV performance.
In summary, we have demonstrated that utilization of fewer
clusters in older adults provides a parsimonious account of age
differences in the Shepard et al. (1961) categorization tasks. We
argue that this view is more consistent with the data than a
rule-complexity account, and a rule-specificity account that
postulates a reliance on single-dimensional rules in older adults.
This does not mean that older adults do not use single-
dimensional rules: although the overall pattern of results was
best explained by the RMC with age deficits in both cluster
formation and choice, the RMC was not able to match the
participant performance on Type I problems, which can be
perfectly represented by single-dimensional rules. It could be
that a hybrid model that combines single-dimensional rules and
a clustering representation would better explain the data, or
perhaps a hierarchical elaboration of the RMC that introduces
rule-like behavior is needed (Heller, Sanborn, & Chater, 2009).
The clustering hypothesis is a start, but there is much about
categorization in older adults that still needs investigation.
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Appendix A
Details of the Rational Model of Categorization
When making a category judgment, the Rational Model of
Categorization (RMC; Anderson, 1991) determines the probability
that a new item, item n, belongs to the ith category (yn  i), based
on the physical features of that item, xn, the physical features of all
of the previously seen items, xn1, and the category labels of all of
the previously seen items, yn1. This can be written as the prob-
ability of the category label and physical features of the new item,
given all the previously seen items and labels
P(yn i |xn, xn-1, yn-1) P(yn i, xn |xn-1, yn-1).
This probability is then transformed into the probability of
making a binary category response i by raising it to the exponent
r and then renormalizing
P(yn i |xn, xn-1, cn-1)r
P(yn i |xn, xn-1, cn-1)r (1 P(yn i |xn, xn-1, cn-1))r.
The probability of a new item and its category label is a
weighted sum of the probability of the item and label arising from
each of the clusters. Because the cluster indices are inferred from
the data, these are marginalized out
P(yn i, xn |xn-1, yn-1)

zn
P(yn i, xn |zn, xn-1, yn-1)P(zn-1 |xn-1, yn-1)P(zn |zn-1), (A1)
where zn is the cluster index of the cluster for item n, and zn-1 are
the cluster indices for the previously seen items.
There are three terms on the right-hand side of Equation A1 that
must be defined. First, the prior probability of the cluster index of
the new item P(zn|zn1) is defined as a Chinese Restaurant Process
prior that can flexibly interpolate between a single cluster for all
the items and a different cluster for each item (Aldous, 1985). This
prior can be written as a simple sequential rich-get-richer process
Pzn k |zn-1
 cMk1 c ci 1 if Mk 0 i.e., k is old1 c
1 c ci 1 if Mk 0 i.e., k is new

where Mk is the number of items assigned to cluster k and c is the
coupling parameter that helps determine the number of clusters.
Second, the posterior on cluster assignments for previous items
can also be built up as a sequential process
Pzn-1|xn-1,yn-1 Pyn1, xn1 |zn-1, xn-2, yn-2
Pzn-2|xn-2, yn-2Pzn1 |zn-2. (A2)
We used the original inference algorithm for the RMC which
assigns an item to the cluster that had the highest probability of
producing that item. This approximation makes simulation fea-
sible relative to summing Equation A1 over all possible parti-
tions of the items into clusters, and it is deterministic which
improves speed of computation. This approximation is sensitive
to the ordering of the items, so the likelihood of each partici-
pant’s responses was computed given the order in which he or
she saw the items.
Finally, we need the likelihood of an item and its category label
given the other items that are already assigned to a cluster. Because
the RMC assumes that within a cluster the category label is
independent from the physical features, and that all of the physical
features are independent from one another
Pyn i, xn |zn, xn-1, yn-1 Pyn i |zn, yn-1
j
Pxj,n |zn, xn-1,
where xj,n is the value of the jth physical feature of item n.
The Shepard et al. (1961) learning task used three binary-valued
physical features, so a Beta-binomial likelihood distribution was
used
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Pxj,n v |zn, xn-1 Bv sPB
.
 2sP
,
where Bv is the number of items in the cluster that match the new
item along the jth physical feature, B. is the number of items in the
cluster, and sP is the parameter of a symmetric Beta prior distri-
bution on the probability of obtaining different features. The
likelihood of the binary-valued category feature uses the same
form with a separate symmetric Beta prior
Pyn v |zn, yn-1 Bv sLB
.
 2sL
.
The parameters used to infer the category label and those used
to infer the cluster assignments are defined by the model to be the
same, but it is possible to use separate parameters in the two
operations (e.g., Nosofsky, 1991). In the results, we separated the
two processes by computing Equation A2 with one set of param-
eters, and then computing the response probabilities in Equation
A1 (given the indices computed in Equation A2) using a different
set of parameters.
Model Fitting Details
The likelihood of participant responses was determined using a
Bernoulli likelihood. We implemented our model in R and used the
nlm function from the stats package (R Core Team, 2016) to search
for the best-fitting parameters. The parameter search was difficult
because the predictions of the RMC can change suddenly with
small changes in the parameters (e.g., Sanborn, Griffiths, & Na-
varro, 2010). We eventually settled on a procedure of running the
nlm function until it converged and then restarting the algorithm
by randomly jittering the best-fitting parameters. The random new
starting point was a sample from a Gaussian distribution centered
on the previous best fit with a SD of 0.5% of the value of the
parameter. We restarted the algorithm at least 30 times for each
model, but finding that some of the models were still improving,
we repeated this exercise until the log likelihood appeared stable
and all models nested within more general models fit worse than
the more general models. For the collection of models we ana-
lyzed, the parameter search required a month on a desktop com-
puter.
Appendix B
Response Consistency
The experimental results showed that for older adults in the
Type II task their responses matched between maximally different
stimuli on approximately half of trials, even when they were
correct on the previous trial. This pattern of behavior could be a
result of random responding, or equivalently the result of choosing
a new single-dimensional rule with equal probability on each trial
from among the complete set of single-dimensional rules.
To determine if young or older adults were randomly respond-
ing in any of the tasks, we calculated a measure of response
consistency, which can identify participants who are at chance
accuracy but are still making consistent responses. This measure
calculated for each stimulus the proportion of trials on which
participants made the same response, which ranged from 0.5 (i.e.,
Alpha to half the trials and Beta to the other half) to 1 (i.e.,
responses were either always Alpha or always Beta).
We simulated the distribution of response consistency for indi-
viduals performing according to chance. Ordering the simulated
response consistency from lowest to highest, the 95th percentile
was almost exactly 2/3, so this value was used as the cut-off for
significance. The proportion of participants that were significantly
above chance in response consistency is shown in Table B1 for
each age group and task type.
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Table B1
Proportion of Participants Significantly Above Chance in
Response Consistency
Age Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Young .98 .81 .83 .77
Older .90 .46 .54 .79
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